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INTRODUCTION
Intersections induce more attention for safety analysis than other roadway elements due to the fact that many intersections are found to be relatively crash-prone spots from a safety point of view. In 2002, approximately 3.2 million intersections related crashes occurred, representing 43 percent of all reported crashes. There were 9,612 fatalities (22 percent of total fatalities) due to crashes that occurred at or within an intersection environment. The cost to society for intersection crashes is approximately $96 billion a year [1] . In order to reduce the number of traffic accidents and to improve the safety and efficiency of traffic, the research on Intelligent Transportation System (ITS) has been developed for many years in many countries [2] . New driving assistance systems such as night vision and collision warning systems (CWS) have been designed, tested, and deployed using the advanced technologies like sensing, computing, and communication technologies [3, 4, 5, 6, 7] . Despite the fact that intersection collision accounts for almost 43% of all crashes, intersection collision avoidance systems received less attention than the forward collision avoidance systems [5, 8] . The reason, besides the fact that the intersection collision problem is more complicated than rear-end crash, is the limitation of the radar technology, the most widely used object sensing method in vehicle collision avoidance systems. Most radar systems require line-of-sight for object detection. This renders ineffective collision warning/avoidance system that requires line-of-sight for threat detection.
Differential global positioning systems (DGPS), electronic compasses, roadside sensors, etc are the current technologies that are under investigation to avoid intersection collisions. There are several disadvantages of these technologies. For example, the GPS signals determine the location of the vehicle with some errors and in some areas, especially in downtown areas with very tall buildings; the signals may not be detected. If there are multiple lanes on the road, then the roadside sensors aren't effective, as they cannot detect all the vehicles. In our earlier work we have developed an intelligent architecture for issuing intersection collision warnings using wireless communications, as they do not require line-of-sight. Using wireless communication technologies, all the vehicles approaching the intersection communicate with the Intersection Traffic Controller (ITC), which is installed at the intersection. The function of the ITC is to broadcast the status of the intersection. Vehicles cooperatively share the critical information such as location, velocity, acceleration, etc with the ITC for collision anticipation and threat detections [9] .
Though the wireless technology will be a viable technology for developing intersection collision warning systems, the risks are inherent in wireless technology unless the system is properly designed. The loss of confidentiality and integrity and the threat of denial of service (DoS) attacks are risks typically associated with wireless communications. Many current communications protocols and commercial products provide inadequate protection and thus present unacceptable risks for any operations [10] . We must actively address such risks to protect their ability to support essential operations, before deployment of wireless technologies.
In this paper, we propose a secure wireless protocol for intersection collision warning systems by using the concept of digital signatures, certificates and certificate chains. Digital certificates are issued by various federal and state organizations. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Background material along with the previous work done on the intersection collision avoidance systems is presented in Section 2. A secure protocol using digital certificates is presented in Section 3. The procedure for the validation of the ITC is presented in Section 4. Performance analysis of the protocol is presented in Section 5. Suggestions and comments are presented in Section 6 and conclusion is presented in Section 7.
BACK GROUND MATERIAL RELATED TO INTERSECTION COLLISION WARNING SYSTEMS AND WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS
The major reasons for intersection crashes are driver inattention, faulty perception, and impaired or obstructed vision. Thus, a timely warning of upcoming intersection should be helpful. General human factor issues considered in an Intersection Collision Avoidance System (ICAS) include what information to present to the driver (warning content), when to present it (timing of warning), and how to present it (type of warning modality) [11] . Lloyd et al. [11] tried to use brake pulsing as haptic warning for an intersection collision avoidance countermeasure. This Intersection Collision Avoidance System (ICAS) involves technologies such as multiple beam radar system, geographical information system (GIS) and a Global Positioning System (GPS). The GIS-GPS uses data derived from an in-board map database to detect an upcoming intersection, identify the traffic control requirement at the intersection, and determine the vehicle's distance to the intersection. This information combine with data regarding vehicle's dynamic state and driver's vehicle operation is used to calculate whether the vehicle can stop before entering the intersection. A warning is provided if the system detects that the vehicle will not stop before the intersection zone [11] . This haptic warning system (HWS) focuses on unsignalized (stop-sign-controlled)
intersections. An ICAS for signalized intersection needs integration with the traffic control infrastructure therefore is more complex than an ICAS for unsignalized intersections.
Ferlis [12] outlined an infrastructure collision avoidance concept for straight crossing path crashes at signalized intersection. The infrastructure-based intersection collision-avoidance systems use roadside sensors, processors, warning devices, and traffic signals to provide crossing assistance to motorists and pedestrians. The sensors identify potential violators by determining the speed and/or deceleration rate of each vehicle approaching towards the intersection. The processing system would identify vehicles at an upstream control point that are unlikely to stop at the intersection. Once a violator is identified, warnings would be conveyed to the violator and other drivers on adjacent approaches to the intersection.
White and Eccles [13] designed an infrastructure-based intersection collision-avoidance system (ICAS) to prevent left-turn crashes with opposite-direction traffic. The major cause of left turn across the path of oppositedirection traffic crashes is the inability of the left-turning motorist to adequately perceive the required gap for a left turn. The proposed ICAS compares turning times and the approach times of the opposite-direction vehicle. Using this comparison, ICAS provides guidance to the left-turning motorist in the form of a dynamic sign to assist in the left-turn decision. This system relies solely on presence detectors, which have good reliability in varying weather or traffic conditions. The major limitation of this system is that it does not actually detect speeds and relies on assumed speeds.
The performance of the ICAS will be susceptible for vehicles that deviate greatly from those assumed values.
In our earlier work we developed Intelligent Architecture for Issuing Intersection Collision Warnings (IAIICW) [9] . This architecture requires that every vehicle must be equipped with a wireless device to communicate with the Intersection Traffic Controller (ITC). We assumed that all intersections are installed with an ITC, and all roads of the intersection are equipped with a mechanism to determine the road number, lane number and distance from the intersection. We also assumed that all vehicles are capable of detecting the road number, lane number and distance from the intersection. The ITC broadcasts the condition of the intersection using messages and also receives the information from the vehicles approaching the intersection. As a vehicle approaches an intersection, using the infrastructure system present at the intersection, the vehicle's onboard computer knows on which road number, lane number it is present and the distance from the intersection. The vehicle receives its speed and acceleration from the in-vehicle network. This information is sent to the ITC through the wireless communication using the specific message format. The vehicle's onboard computer receives the broadcasted messages from the ITC and checks the information in the message that corresponds to the road number and lane number of the vehicle. From the message, the vehicle's on-board computer determines whether the signal at the intersection is green, yellow or red and the time left for the signal to change from its current state to the next state. The on-board computer calculates the time left for the vehicle to reach the intersection and checks whether the vehicle can pass the intersection without violating the traffic signal. From the message, the vehicle's on-board computer knows if any other vehicle has violated the traffic signal. If any vehicle violates the traffic signal, the on-board computer issues pre-warning to the driver indicating that a vehicle has violated the traffic signal Intersection collision avoidance systems that use wireless communication technology must be protected from various types of security attacks. Digital identities and security technologies enable the security services like authentication, authorization, digital signature and encryption to exchange messages over the wireless network. A brief background of security techniques is presented in the following subsections of this paper.
DIGITAL CERTIFICATES
There is a broad range of applications for digital certificates: electronic banking, electronic payment systems, e-mail communication, identification in communication with public authorities (e.g. transportation, tax declaration, court documents, electronic passports, public health service, etc.), electronic contracts, selective web access, selective database access, etc. Public-key cryptography is a keyfactor for the solution of the transaction security problems arising with the commercial use of the Internet: authenticity, integrity, confidentiality and non-repudiation [14, 15] .
Public key cryptography is based on the use of key pairs. When using a key pair, one of the keys, referred to as the private key is kept secret and under the control of owner. The other key, referred to as the public key, can be disseminated freely for use by any person who wishes to participate in security services with the person holding the private key. The private key and public key are mathematically related but it remains computationally infeasible to derive the private key from the knowledge of public key. In theory, any individual can send the holder of a private key a message encrypted using the corresponding public key and only the holder of the private key can decrypt the secure message. Similarly, the holder of the private key can establish the integrity and origin of the data he sends to another party by digitally signing the data using his private key. Any one who receives the data can use the associated public key to validate that it came from the holder of the private key and verify the integrity of the data has been maintained.
KEY AND CERTIFICATE MANAGEMENT
The distribution and management of the public key is the crucial point in the procedures described above. It must be guaranteed that the key really belongs to the respective person (or e-mail address or authorization role). A means to guarantee this is the use of digital certificates. They are digital documents containing the public key, the name of the possessor, the digital signature of the certification authority (CA) that issued the certificate and the certificate validity period. In this way the problem of key management is reduced to the public key of the CA. Once in possession of the trustworthy public key, the end user is able to verify all certificates issued by the certification authority. The function of a CA is therefore the verification of the identity of the certificate holder. The certification of identity is only the simplest form of a certificate. Similar extensions are provided with role-based systems as the Simple Public Key Infrastructure (SPKI) [16] . With the use of application-specific extensions, the function of the certification authority is extended to the verification of the respective attributes of the certificate holders.
TRUSTED THIRD PARTIES AND CROSS CERTIFICATION
The Nation-wide use of certificates causes the emerging of a large number of certificate issuers. One cause for this is that a certificate issuer needs a certain regional presence in order to verify the identity of a person. From this point of view, an organization issuing certificates consists of a large number of locally operating entities, independent from each other. For the end users, the management of different trustworthy public keys is not applicable, because each of these would have to be transmitted in a secure way. This problem can be solved by the use of cross certificates. These are certificates issued by a CA certifying another CA. In this way, an end user is able to verify a certificate issued by a CA whose public key was not directly transmitted to the end user. For the verification, there must only be a link via cross certificates to the CA whose trustworthy public key is with the end user. This link is also called certification path or chain of trust. The CA whose trustworthy public key is provided is called trusted third party [17, 18] . Using these mechanisms, a system can be built that consists of several certification authorities issuing certificates for individuals but also building links between each other using cross certificates. In an ideal situation, each end user is able to verify the certificates of any other person using only one trusted third party in this system. The combination of certification authorities linked to each other via cross certificates and the end users is called public-key infrastructure [19] .
SECURED ITC AND WIRELESS PROTOCOL
In this section of the paper we briefly explain the protocol for the ITC that has to be broadcasted and then explain the protocol for the digital certificates.
ITC PROTOCOL
The role of ITC in the Intersection Collision Avoidance System (ICAS) is to broadcast the condition of the intersection for the traffic crossing the intersection [9] . The broadcasted messages have a specific format so that all the vehicles can understand easily. The length of the message varies depending upon the number of roads, lanes and signal lights present at an intersection. The messages are broadcasted in the form of packets. Figure 1a shows an overview of the message format that is broadcasted by an ITC.
All messages begin with a Start of Message (SOM) field. This serves to identify the beginning of a message. The second field in the message is always the ITC field, which contains 16-bit ITC number field. This field is used to identify the intersection. The third field in the message is the vehicle violation field. This field contains one bit, which is used to determine whether any vehicle has violated the traffic signal.
Field number four is called the Intersection status field. This is a variable length field. The first four bits are used to specify the number of roads present at the intersection. Following these four bits are road information fields. The length of road information fields depends upon the number of roads present at the intersection. The road information field is again divided into a 4-bit road number field and a road status field. The length of the road status field depends upon the number of signal lights and lanes present on a particular road. The first part of the road status field is the number of lanes field, which is four-bit wide. This field specifies the number of lanes present on a particular road. The second field is the number of signal lights field, which contains two bits. This field specifies the number of signal lights present for a particular road. Following the number of signal lights field is the lane information field. The lane information field is of variable length. This field is repeated depending upon the number of signal lights present on a road.
The
The second sub field specifies the lane numbers of the road following the respective signal light. The third sub field is lane status field, which contains four bits. These four bits are L bit, T bit, R bit and U bit, which specify whether the vehicles on a particular lane can go left, through, right or make a U turn, respectively or not. The last sub field is the signal status field, which has two fields. The First field is the signal field which is of three bits and specifies the signal status i.e. whether the signal is red, green, yellow, blinking yellow or blinking red and the second field is the time field which contains 32 bits, specifying the time left for the signal change. 
DIGITAL CERTIFICATE FORMAT:
Our secured system is based on digital signatures. A digital signature is a kind of cryptographic check sum where the vehicle's On Board Unit (OBU) can verify the checksum and thus convince itself that the messages it received is the one that was sent by an authorized ITC.
Digital certificates not only carry the public key but also some information about what it's authorized to do. In our system, OBUs (the units in cars) contain only public key and a range of valid dates. The public key is issued to the OBU by USDOT at the time of manufacturing the vehicle. ITC's, on the other hand contain their public key, unique serial number, valid dates and digital signature. Fig 1c shows the format of the digital certificate. The digital certificate contains nine fields. The first field is Start Of Message (SOM) field, which contains 16bits and is used to identify the beginning of the certificate. The second field is the hierarchy level field, which is one byte long. The lower 3 bits specify the hierarchy level and the remaining bits are reserved for the future use. The third field is the Issuer ID field. This field serves to identify which Certificate Authority (CA) is signing the certificate. The length of this field is three bytes. Field number four is validity field. This field specifies how long the certificate is valid and is 4 bytes long. The fifth field is Subject ID field, which is 3 bytes long. This field specifies the ID of the certificate recipient. Field number six is called Public Key field. This field is 16 bytes long and is used to determine the public key of the certificate recipient. Seventh field is the Digital signature field with 16 bytes. This field is used to verify the signature signed by the certificate issuing authority. Next field is the CRC field, which is two bytes long and is used to verify the CRC check. The last field is the End Of Message (EOM) field and is served to specify the end of message with 2 bytes length. The total length of the digital certificate is 49 bytes. 
ITC VALIDATION
In our architecture we used unidirectional chain of certificates for validating the ITC messages in which USDOT acts as a certifying authority and is trusted by everyone. During the manufacturing of the vehicle the USDOT's public key is embedded in the vehicles OBU. USDOT issues and signs a certificate for each state. certifying authority and signs a certificate for each city and each city acts as a certifying authority and signs a certificate for each ITC. For an ITC the certificate chain looks like the one shown in Figure 2a .An ITC is issued a (private, public) key pair by its city. This key pair is embedded in the hardware of the ITC. The ITC broadcasts all traffic related messages after encrypting the messages by its private key. All vehicles that are near the intersection need the public key of the ITC to decrypt the messages sent by the ITC. The vehicles can get the public key of the ITC by going through the chain of certificates that are embedded in the ITC. As a vehicle approaches the intersection it starts receiving the messages from the ITC. The vehicle's OBU ignores the messages it received until the OBU receives the public key of the ITC. To get the public key of the ITC the OBU first requests the ITC for the state certificate. From the state certificate sent by the ITC the OBU verifies the signature using the USDOT's public key, which is embedded in its software and extracts the public key of the state. After extracting the public key of the state, the OBU requests the ITC for the county certificate. Using the state's public key it verifies the county certificate and gets the public key of the county. Next the OBU asks for the city certificate and verifies the certificate using the count's public key and extracts the city's public key from the certificate. Finally the OBU requests for the ITC certificate and using the city's public key it verifies the ITC certificate and extracts the public key of the ITC. Once the OBU gets the public key of the ITC, it starts accepting the messages received from the ITC. The whole process of verification is explained in brief using Let's examine a simple example. Figure 2c illustrates the hierarchy of CAs. The hexagons represent the CAs, the arrows represent certificate issuance, and the sectional rectangles represent certificates. Consider an ITC, which is at the intersection of Warren and Woodward roads, is broadcasting the status of the intersection and a vehicle V1 is approaching the intersection and attempting to verify the ITC certificate. We construct a certification path between the ITC certificate and the US-DOT certificate. The certification starts from the US-DOT certificate and works its way to the ITC. The path is US-DOT Michigan-DOT Wayne-DOT Detroit-DOT ITC. The vehicle's OBU verifies the Michigan-DOT certificate and confirms that US-DOT is the issuer of Michigan-DOT certificate and hence trusts the Michigan-DOT. Similarly the vehicle's OBU verifies the certificate of Wayne-DOT and confirms that Michigan-DOT is the issuer of Wayne-DOT certificate and so on until the ITC certificate is verified.
PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
An ITC will broadcast (in real time) the information of the approaching vehicles and change of traffic signals to all the vehicles approaching towards the intersection [9] . The ITC broadcasts the message once in every 10 milliseconds so that the vehicles receive the updated signal information and keep track of the situation at the intersection. The total length of the message that is broadcasted by the ITC with N number of roads, L n lanes per road and S signal lights per road is bits [9] . For wireless communications, there is a huge overhead for sending raw data. The actual amount of overhead depends on the specific coding technique used for the wireless communication. For example, for the Rate 1/3 FEC (Forward Error Correction) coding, three copies of every raw data bit are sent through the air. Thus, for the Rate 1/3 FEC coding the overhead is going to be more than 200%, because some additional bits will be necessary for packet headers, synchronization bits, end of frames, etc. Similarly, for the Rate 2/3 FEC coding, the overhead is going to be more than 50%. In this paper, we assume an overhead of 100% for our analysis. Let be the bandwidth required by an ITC to broadcast its messages. The value of can be expressed as:
( 42 4 10 . . Table I shows the bandwidth required by an ITC to broadcast its messages. From Table I it is seen that the maximum bandwidth required for broadcasting the messages is 0.349 Mbps. As explained in Section 3.1, the length of the message that has to be broadcasted by the vehicle is 96 bits. Let N v be the total number of vehicles at an intersection. Consider that the vehicles are communicating with the ITC every t ms. Let be the bandwidth required by an ITC to accept messages from all the vehicles. If we consider an overhead of 100% in converting the raw bits into wireless packets, then the bandwidth can be expressed as: Generally it is recommended that a driver should maintain at least a 2-second distance between his vehicle and the vehicle at the front. Let us consider the situation where a driver is maintaining only a 1-second distance instead of a 2-second distance. In this situation the distance maintained between the vehicles is 1. 
ITC
As explained in Section 3.2, the length of the digital certificate is 49 bytes. Table IV shows the distance traveled by the vehicle during the authentication process for different ranges of ITC. Here the intersection is assumed to have four roads with four lanes per road. From Table I , the bandwidth required for four roads with four lanes per road is 0.135 Mbps. The average length of the vehicle is assumed to be 17 feet and the total bandwidth available from the wireless communication system is assumed to be 9 Mbps, which is same as that of the DSRC systems. Figure 3a also shows that when all vehicles are moving slow, more time is needed for ITC authentications. This is due to the fact that when vehicles move slower, the gaps between consecutive vehicles decrease. As a result, there are more vehicles within the range of an ITC. Therefore, more time is needed to authenticate the ITC by all the vehicles within its range. Figure 3b shows the distance that a vehicle will go through while it is authenticating an ITC. This figure shows that for an intersection with four roads and four lanes per road, the vehicles will move only a fraction of a foot during the ITC authentication process. Figure 3c shows similar results for an intersection with 8 roads and 8 lanes per road with and an ITC range of up to 500 feet. Figure 3c shows that even for a very large intersection with 8 roads and 8 lanes per road in each direction, the vehicles will move only a few feet during the ITC authentication process. Thus, we can say that the time required for ITC authentication by all the vehicles is not too much, and it is acceptable for all practical purposes. Tables V and VI show the total distance traveled, with a reaction time of one second, by a vehicle before it stops after the warning has been issued. Normally it takes some time for two wireless devices to establish a link after they come within their range. Let us assume that a vehicle needs one-second time to establish a wireless link with an ITC. On highways, the intersections are far away from each other and the speed limit is 55 mph. Let us consider a situation where a driver is going at 60 mph. Since an average vehicle can decelerate at the rate of 15 to 20 ft/sec 2 , from Table VI we see that for a vehicle speed of 60 mph, the maximum distance traveled by a vehicle from the instance the warning is given until the vehicle is stopped is 346 feet. The distance traveled in one second during the link establishment time is 88 ft, and the distance traveled during the ITC authentication process is under couple of feet at a vehicle speed of 60 mph (see Figures  3b and 3c) . Thus, the total distance traveled by a vehicle, from the time the vehicle starts communicating with an ITC until it stops when a warning is issued, is 346+88+2 = 436 feet. From the above analysis it is clear that on highways the range of an ITC should be greater than 436 feet.
In downtown areas, the intersections are closer to each other and the speed limit is 35 mph. Let us consider a situation where a driver is going at 40 mph. From Table  VI , we see that for a vehicle speed of 40 mph, the distance traveled by a vehicle from the instance the warning is issued is 173 feet. The distance traveled during the link establishment time is 59 feet, and the distance traveled during the ITC authentication process is under 2 feet. Thus, the total distance traveled by a vehicle, from the time the vehicle starts communicating with an ITC until it stops when a warning is issued, is 173+59+2 = 234 feet. Hence, for downtown areas the range of an ITC must be greater than 234 feet. 
SUGGESTIONS AND COMMENTS
When the intersections are very close to each other, say within 300 feet from each other, a vehicle that moves from the region of one ITC to another may not get enough time to establish a link with the new ITC, authenticate the new ITC and stop when a warning is issued unless the vehicle moves very slow, say under 30 mph. In this case, a vehicle may need to establish a link with the next ITC before it leaves the intersection of the previous ITC. In other words, the vehicle will communicate with two ITCs: the current one and the next one. However, before the vehicle leaves the intersection of one ITC, it will have limited communications with the ITC of the next intersection. We would like to investigate this case in our future work.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have presented a secure wireless protocol for intersection collision warning systems. We provided the detailed description of the digital certificate format along with the authentication process. We also investigated the feasibility of implementing the protocol using the available technology. Suggestions are made to improve the functionality of the protocol for downtown areas where the intersections are very close to each other.
